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Abstract 
The U.S. Congress regulated the railroad industry in 1887, and over the course of the 20th 
century also granted the industry significant antitrust immunities. Antitrust immunities are laws 
that expressly exempt an industry from prosecution under antitrust laws, such as the Sherman 
Act. Presumably, the rationale for railroad antitrust immunities was that because railroads were 
stringently regulated, the regulators alone would uphold antitrust principles and make antitrust 
litigation unnecessary. However, culminating in the passage of the Staggers Rail Act of 1980, the 
railroad industry was largely deregulated, yet retained many antitrust immunities. This has 
raised concerns among shippers and consumers that railroad companies, which often face 
neither regulation nor antitrust liability, can freely commit anticompetitive abuses. Given these 
concerns and currently proposed legislation to abolish railroad antitrust immunities, the 
purpose of this paper is to evaluate the efficacy of legal outcomes in a counterfactual situation 
where antitrust immunities are abolished. To reach this end, I will first clarify railroad 
regulation and deregulation, antitrust laws as they apply to all other industries, and the poorly 
understood railroad antitrust immunities.  
Antitrust laws … are the Magna Carta of free enterprise. They are as important to the 
preservation of economic freedom and our free enterprise system as the Bill of Rights is 
to the protection of our fundamental personal freedoms. 
Justice Thurgood Marshall (U.S. v. Topco Associates, 1972) 
1. Introduction 
In a purely competitive market, the number of buyers and sellers is so large that any one of 
them cannot affect the market price, which through competition is driven down to equal the 
marginal cost of production. If certain additional assumptions are valid, a competitive market 
maximizes efficiency and welfare for both producers and consumers (Bernanke & Frank, 2007). 
Railroad transportation markets, however, deviate in several ways from the conditions 
necessary for purely competitive, efficient markets. First, due to the large expenditures required 
to start a railroad company, railroad companies often exhibit economies of scale. Economies of 
scale, which are often associated with behemoth firms, violate a requirement for competitive 
markets and mean that as production expands, average costs decrease. Firms with economies of 
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scale can drive smaller competitors into bankruptcy by using their low costs to temporarily 
decrease prices—only to raise them once the competition has been eliminated (a practice known 
as predatory pricing). Second, in any particular railroad market there is often an insufficient 
number of competitors for the market price to be driven down to its competitive equilibrium. A 
railroad market is defined as transporting commodity X from discrete locations A to B. It is 
usually not in a rail firm’s interest to expend a significant outlay to build a rail line directly 
beside a competitors’ rail line, so many railroad markets have a severe dearth of competition—
often only one firm. Third, in addition to specific railroad markets, the overall railroad industry 
is exceedingly concentrated with four firms controlling nearly 90% of the freight traffic in the 
United States (S. Rep. No. 112-38, 2011). When these industry conditions are present, there is 
not sufficient competition to make the market efficient, and firms possess market power. Market 
power is the ability to charge prices above marginal costs, and it implies market inefficiency and 
welfare losses for consumers (Bernanke & Frank, 2007). Market power can be expressed 
through prices exceeding marginal costs or though other forms of anticompetitive conduct that 
will be further discussed in this paper.  
When market power is present, there are two ways public policy can counteract the harmful 
consequences for consumers. First, statuary regulation can prescribe what is acceptable, such as 
direct price regulation. In Section 2, Railroad Regulation, I will discuss in greater detail the 
history of the statutory regulation of the railroad industry. Second, parties who are harmed by 
anticompetitive conduct can use the antitrust laws to sue for damages and injunctions in court. 
The antitrust laws are a collection of statutes that are intended to promote competition and thus 
reduce prices, and in Section 3, The Antitrust Laws, I will explain how they apply to virtually all 
industries. 
In 1887, Congress created the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC), a federal agency 
that, among other things, had the power to directly regulate railroad rates. The ICC’s purpose 
was to stop firms with market power from raising prices above what would have prevailed in a 
competitive market. Throughout the 20th century, the railroad industry also accumulated 
antitrust immunities, which are laws that exempt an industry from prosecution under the 
antitrust laws. I will further explicate the railroad antitrust immunities, which have been called 
the “most convoluted story in American antitrust,” (Saggers, 2009) below in Section 4, Railroad 
Antitrust Immunities. 
According to the U.S. Supreme Court, the rationale for railroad antitrust immunities was 
that the heavy ICC regulation alone would be “an effective safeguard against the evils attending 
monopoly, at which the [antitrust laws] are directed” (Mclean Trucking Co. v. U.S., 1944). 
However, culminating in the passage of the Staggers Rail Act of 1980, Congress largely revoked 
the ICC’s regulatory power over railroads and gave railroads more flexibility to set their own 
rates. Despite undermining the rationale for the immunities’ existence by deregulating the 
industry, Congress retained the antitrust immunities. Without regulation or applicable antitrust 
laws, shippers and consumers are now concerned that railroad companies can freely exploit 
their market power to engage in anticompetitive conduct and raise prices above marginal costs.  
Oregon Undergraduate Research Journal   William Goodling 
1.1 Fall 2011  8 
Given these concerns, the purpose of this paper is to analyze the legal ramifications of a 
counterfactual situation in which antitrust immunities are abolished. To that end, I will first 
clarify railroad regulation and deregulation (Section 2 below), antitrust laws as they apply to 
other industries (Section 3 below), and the railroad industry’s antitrust immunities (Section 4 
below). This is an important and timely investigation because several industry developments are 
consistent with market power abuse, such as significant upward trends in rates and industry 
profitability since 2001 and several railroad practices that would arguably merit antitrust 
liability if not for the railroad antitrust exemptions (S. Rep No. 111-9, 2009). These concerns of 
market power abuse prompted members of the U.S. Congress to propose current legislation, the 
Railroad Antitrust Enforcement Act of 2011, to abolish all railroad antitrust immunities (S. 49, 
2011). 
2. Railroad Regulation 
The first federal regulation of interstate railroads began with the Interstate Commerce Act of 
1887, which established the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) that regulated railroad 
mergers, routes, and most important, rates (i.e., prices). Through direct regulation, the ICC 
attempted to set rates consistent with the public interest, and to curtail rate discrimination 
based on person, place, or length of haul considerations.  
Though the authority was implied by the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, the Hepburn Act 
of 1906 explicitly granted the ICC power to set maximum rates, and the Transportation Act of 
1920 explicitly empowered the ICC to set minimum rates and to regulate all entry and exit of 
firms from railroad markets. By 1945, the ICC’s regulation was expansive, including rates, line 
abandonment, service discontinuities, mergers, car flow, and interchange rules (Wilson & 
Burton, 2003), all of which Viscusi et al. (1998) note was “extensively used” (554). Therefore, in 
this era, federal regulators closely managed nearly all aspects of the railroad industry and widely 
used their authority to set maximum rates to counteract market power abuse, such as rates 
exceeding marginal costs. With such dominant regulation, antitrust laws were considered 
duplicative and unnecessary, so the railroad companies were exempted. 
In the 1970s, the rise of competing alternative modes of transportation (truck and barge) 
and the inflexibility of ICC regulations – which constrained railroads from adequately adapting 
to the changing market conditions – lead to problems in the railroad industry. Railroad 
companies had deteriorating tracks, low productivity, poor financial performance, and many 
went bankrupt. In an attempt to revitalize the industry, Congress deregulated the railroad 
companies under the Rail Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976 (4-R Act) and most 
importantly under the Staggers Rail Act (1980). 
The 4-R Act established a “zone of reasonableness” within which railroads could freely set 
their rates, created easier procedures for abandoning routes, and eased merger restrictions. 
However, if the ICC found a firm to be “market dominant” (defined as controlling 70% of all 
traffic in a rail market or having revenue-to-variable cost ratio exceeding 1.8), then the ICC 
gained jurisdiction to conduct a rate reasonableness inquiry. If the rate was found unreasonable, 
the ICC prescribed rate regulation (Wilson, 1996). However, Winston, Corsi, Grimm and Evans 
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(1990) demonstrated that under the ICC’s narrow application of the 4-R Act in the late 1970s, 
the legislation did not cause a significant change in the railroad regulatory regime, meaning the 
ICC still had overwhelmingly regulatory control of the railroad industry. 
The Staggers Rail Act of 1980 most significantly deregulated the railroad industry. The 
preamble of the Staggers Rail Act states that it is the policy of the United States Government to 
“allow, to the maximum extent possible, competition and the demand for services to establish 
reasonable rates for transportation by rail” (49 USC §10101). Unless the ICC found a railroad to 
be “market dominant” and then found its rates unreasonable, railroads gained freedom to set 
their own rates. The Staggers Act also eased merger guidelines, facilitated abandonment of 
unprofitable segments of network as well as entry into new markets, and encouraged private, 
confidential contracts in rate setting. Essentially, for the first time since 1887, railroad 
companies gained the freedom to set their own rates. Coupled with a dearth of competition or 
the presence of economies of scale or both, this was an invitation for the railroad companies to 
use their market power to raise rates beyond marginal costs and therefore reduce consumer 
welfare. 
The passage of the ICC Termination Act of 1995 replaced the ICC with a much smaller 
federal agency, the Surface Transportation Board (STB). The STB has jurisdiction to (1) 
adjudicate rate reasonableness cases brought by shippers against railroads, (2) prescribe new 
regulations, and (3) approve rail transactions, such as line sales, line construction, line 
abandonment, and mergers (Government Accountability Office [GAO], 2006). The STB does not 
directly regulate rates, so the only venue for regulatory relief from market power abuse is STB 
rate reasonableness adjudications. However, there is wide concern that the proceedings are 
“largely inaccessible,” “expensive, time consuming, and complex” and may be financially 
prohibitive (GAO, 2006). Johnstone (2009) and Pittman (2010a) argue that the complexity, 
expense, and likelihood of failure in these proceedings have rendered them useless for most 
shippers. Indeed, on average it costs $3.3 million over three years to litigate a rate 
reasonableness case (GAO, 2006), a price that is prohibitive for all but the biggest shippers. 
In sum, the railroad industry transitioned from being heavily regulated in the first half of the 
20th century to being significantly deregulated by 1980 and onwards. The ICC’s forceful direct 
regulation once was a justification for antitrust immunities, but today the STB’s ineffectual 
venue of rate reasonableness adjudication rarely constrains railroad company’s pricing 
decisions. Coupled with antitrust immunities, this implies that railroad companies can exploit 
their market power to raise prices and engage in anticompetitive conduct. 
3. The Antitrust Laws 
3.1.  Statutory Fundamentals 
The first major antitrust law was the Sherman Act of 1890, which has two foundational 
prohibitions: 
Section 1: “every contract, combination … or conspiracy in restraint of trade …[is] illegal.” 
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Section 2: “every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or … conspire 
with any other person … to monopolize … shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.”  
Section 1 governs mutual conduct, especially acts that coordinate sellers by the use of formal 
agreements. Mutual seller conduct, such as agreements to fix prices, is an expression of market 
power antithetical to competitive markets; instead of competing to lower prices, firms are 
conspiring to jointly raise prices. Likewise, monopolization is repugnant to competitive markets 
because monopolization is the process of forcing out competitors through illicit means, such as 
using economies of scale to engage in predatory pricing or undergoing mergers designed to 
reduce competition. 
In 1914, the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTC Act) established the Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC), an agency designed to perform both investigatory and adjudicative 
functions. Section 5 of FTC Act created a foundational antitrust law, stating that “unfair 
methods of competition … and unfair or deceptive acts” are illegal. The FTC has the power to 
determine what is “unfair” and issue cease and desist orders, which are binding in 60 days 
unless appealed in court. Only the FTC can bring cases under the FTC Act, and it can only apply 
civil penalties. However, this law is subject to a railroad antitrust exemption that is further 
discussed in Section 4: in the railroad industry, only the STB can enforce the FTC Act, not the 
FTC (15 USC §21[a]). 
Perhaps in an attempt to define the vagueness of the Sherman Act, the Clayton Act (1914) 
explicitly prohibits four forms of conduct that were arguably implied by Section 1 of the 
Sherman Act’s prohibition on “restraint of trade.” The four forms of conduct prohibited by the 
Clayton Act are: 
Section 2: price discrimination 
Section 3: exclusionary practices (i.e., excluding a competitor by making it a condition of a 
purchase that the customer cannot later buy from a competitor) 
Section 7: mergers “where the effect may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to 
create a monopoly” 
Section 8: interlocking directorates  
The Clayton Act also increased the available damages for violations of either the Sherman 
Act or the Clayton Act to treble damages (damages triple what makes the harmed party “whole”) 
and allowed for injunctions to prohibit specific conduct. 
3.2. Judicial Interpretation 
Based on these broad phrases and prohibitions, antitrust law in the U.S. is created through a 
common law process of precedents from courts and enforcement agencies to determine what 
practices are illegal in what situations. While private parties can sue under the Sherman Act and 
the Clayton Act, the main burden of enforcement falls on two government agencies: civil and 
criminal actions via the U.S. Department of Justice Antitrust Division, and exclusively civil 
actions via the Federal Trade Commission (Caves, 1994). Due to the nonspecific nature of the 
statutes, enforcement has gone through periods of high scrutiny to lax scrutiny. Below is a 
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survey of the law of (A) monopolization, (B) conspiracies in restraint of trade, such as price-
fixing, and (C) select issues in exclusionary conduct.  
A. Monopolization (Section 2 of the Sherman Act) 
As Viscusi et al. (1998) notes, Section 2 of the Sherman Act has been the most difficult 
antitrust law for courts to interpret, because the Sherman Act prohibits the process of 
monopolization but not necessarily the market position of being a monopolist. The market 
position of being a monopolist is traditionally defined as having a large market share, such as 
producing 60% of a particular good. Courts must balance the tension between discouraging 
anticompetitive monopolization without discouraging superior performance and efficiency that 
may lead to a monopoly.  
In 1911, the Supreme Court had its first major test of how it would interpret Section 2 of the 
Sherman Act. Standard Oil Company and American Tobacco Company both controlled around 
90% of their markets, and both firms used a wide range of aggressive conduct towards their 
rivals. For example, Standard Oil was accused of engaging in predatory pricing to drive 
competitors out of business by buying pipelines to foreclose crude oil supplies to rivals, securing 
discriminatory rail freight rates, and conducting business espionage. In U.S. v. Standard Oil Co. 
(1911) and in U.S. v. American Tobacco Co. (1911), the Court found both firms guilty under 
Section 1 and Section 2 of the Sherman Act and ordered their dissolution into several 
independent firms.  
The most important consequence of these cases was the doctrine that the Court established 
to interpret the Sherman Act. The Court reasoned that the plain text of the Sherman Act was too 
extreme to be enforceable, and decided that not “every” restraint of trade or attempt to 
monopolize is illegal, but only those that are “unreasonable” or “injurious” (U.S. v. American 
Tobacco Co., 1911). For adjudicating Sherman Act cases, determining what is a reasonable or 
injurious restraint of trade is known as the Rule of Reason doctrine. In State Oil Co. v Kahn et 
al. (1997), the Court summarized the Rule of Reason: 
… [Sherman Act] claims are analyzed under a ‘Rule of Reason,’ according to which the 
finder of fact must decide whether the questioned practice imposes an unreasonable 
restraint on competition, taking into account a variety of factors, including specific 
information about the relevant business, its condition before and after the restraint was 
imposed, and the restraint’s history, nature, and effect. 
In U.S. v. American Tobacco Co. (1911) and U.S. v. Standard Oil Co. (1911), the Court ruled 
that the companies’ use of their large market share to engage in coercive actions against their 
rivals was unreasonable and therefore illegal, but also emphasized that high seller concentration 
alone need not necessarily be unreasonable. 
In this era of monopolization jurisprudence, Sherman Act Section 2 violations were difficult 
to prove, prompting one commentator to call the law a “dead letter” (Gellhorn & Kovacic, 1994). 
For example, although U.S. Steel Corporation held 60% of the nation’s iron and steel capacity, in 
U.S. v. U.S. Steel Corp. (1920) the Court ruled that its acquisitions of competing companies were 
not an illegal attempt to monopolize. The Court’s reasoning was that “the law does not make 
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mere size an offense,” meaning that they interpreted Section 2 to not prohibit the market 
structure of monopoly, but only to prohibit the conduct of unreasonable monopolization.  
The ruling in U.S. v. Aluminum Co. of America (U.S. v. Alcoa) (1945) effectively ended the 
previous Sherman Act Section 2 doctrine. Alcoa controlled 90% of U.S. aluminum production, 
and even without engaging in overtly unreasonable anticompetitive conduct, its size alone 
constituted a violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act. Despite that Section 2 prohibits 
monopolizing but not monopolies, the Court argued, “A firm can gain and protect a monopoly 
position in ways more subtle than taking the bloody axe to its competitors.” They reasoned that 
Alcoa engaged in practices that were not overtly predatory, but still effectively resulted in 
monopolization of the market, such as building capacity ahead of demand to foreclose potential 
rivals. This ruling suggested that all companies with substantial market share were suspect, and 
perhaps presumably liable, for monopolizing under Section 2 of the Sherman Act. 
Since the early 1970s, the courts have retreated from the encompassing approach of U.S. v. 
Alcoa (1945). In addition to a large market share, the courts are increasingly requiring that the 
conduct itself be an overt attempt to monopolize. Two major types of conduct that are 
potentially illegal monopolization are predatory pricing and refusal-to-deal.  
Predatory pricing occurs when a firm, supported by economies of scale and a large market 
share, charges a price below marginal cost to force out competitors. This is illegal 
monopolization because the only possible benefit of charging a price where the firm is losing 
money is to bankrupt a competitor so as to later gain a monopoly position and then excessively 
raise prices. Refusal-to-deal monopolization occurs when a business reduces competition by 
refusing to sell to another business for the purpose of rending them inoperable. Refusal-to-deal 
monopolization occurs if the plaintiff can prove: 
1. The monopolist’s control of an essential facility (or product) 
2. A competitor’s inability to reasonably duplicate the essential facility (or product) 
3. The monopolist’s denial of use of the facility (or product) to a competitor 
4. The monopolist’s feasibility of providing the facility (or product) (Gellhorn & Kovacic, 
1994).  
This is known as the essential facility doctrine, and it is intended to stop monopolists from 
exploiting their control of a resource to obstruct competition—such as a railroad firm owning the 
only track in a rail market and not letting others pay to use it. There is a fifth overriding, case-
by-case consideration in all Rule of Reason analyses: whether or not the defendant advanced a 
reasonable business justification for denying access. If the defendant did advance a reasonable 
business justification for denying access, then they are not guilty of monopolizing under Section 
2 of the Sherman Act.  
In sum, monopolization jurisprudence is continually evolving. During the U.S. v. Alcoa 
(1945) era, having a dominant market share (as the four major railroad companies currently do) 
was sufficient for violation of Section 2 of Sherman Act. More recently, however, merely having 
a dominant market share is not enough to constitute monopolizing; the firm must also engage in 
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specific conduct deemed an injurious attempt to monopolize, such as predatory pricing or 
refusal-to-deal conduct. 
B. Conspiracies in Restraint of Trade (Section 1 of the Sherman Act) 
Unlike the ebbing judicial interpretation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act, interpretation of 
Sherman Act Section 1 prohibition on conspiracies (agreements among would-be competitors) 
to restrain trade has been “the most unambiguous antitrust rule of law” (Viscusi et al., 1998). 
Per se illegal restraints of trade include: 
1. Agreements to fix or maintain prices (U.S. v. Trenton Potteries Co., 1927; U.S. v. Socony-
Vacuum Oil Co., 1940) 
2. Agreements to limit output or productive capacity (U.S. v. Trenton Potteries Co., 1927; 
U.S. v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 1940) 
3. Agreements to share or divide markets (U.S. v. Topco Associates, Inc., 1972) 
A per se violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act means that it is automatically condemned 
as illegal, and is not subject to Rule of Reason deliberations about whether the act amounted to 
an unreasonable restraint of trade. These forms of conduct are so unambiguously adverse to 
competition and consumer welfare that courts automatically rule them illegal restraints of trade. 
C. Exclusionary Conduct (Section 3 of the Clayton Act) 
Section 3 of the Clayton Act makes exclusionary conduct illegal. Exclusionary conduct occurs 
when a company requires buyers of its goods to refrain from purchasing goods from its rivals. 
Types of exclusionary conduct include tying agreements and exclusive-dealing arrangements.  
Tying agreements occur when a company gives a buyer access to one of its goods only if the 
buyer takes others as well. The courts have enforced violations of tying agreements very strictly 
(Caves, 1994). To prove a tying agreement is illegal, the plaintiff must prove:  
1.  There are two distinct products 
2. The seller has required the buyer to purchase the tied product in order to obtain the 
tying product 
3. The seller has market power in the market for the tying product 
4. The tying arrangement affects a substantial amount of commerce in the market for the 
tied product (Grappone, Inc. v. Subaru of New England, Inc., 1988).  
For example, in Northern Pacific Railroad Co. v. United States (1958) the Court found 
Northern Pacific Railroad guilty of a tying agreement because its sale of land adjacent to its rail 
lines required the purchasers to ship commodities only via their company. 
Exclusive-dealing arrangements occur when a seller gives the buyer access to its goods only 
if the buyer agrees to not buy goods from any of the seller’s rivals. The courts have enforced 
violations of exclusive-dealing arrangements if dominant sellers use it to place newcomer sellers 
at a disadvantage (Caves, 1994), and in general, the Courts have treated them harshly (Viscusi et 
al., 1998). To evaluate the reasonableness of exclusive dealing, courts usually consider three 
factors: (1) the extent of market foreclosure, (2) the duration of the exclusive dealing, with 
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agreements less than one year “presumptively lawful” (Roland Machinery Co. v. Dresser 
Industry, 1984), and (3) the height of entry barriers (Gellhorn & Kovacic, 1994). If entry barriers 
to the market are small, the exclusive-dealing arrangement is likely to be legal; if entry barriers 
are significant (such as the large expenditures required to start a railroad), exclusive-dealing 
arrangements are likely to be found illegal. 
4. Railroad Antitrust Immunity 
The railroad industry was exempted from antitrust laws in an era of direct railroad 
regulation under the rationale that the regulators alone would promote competition and avoid 
market power abuse. The antitrust exemptions for the railroad industry are disparate and 
complex, but nevertheless the exemptions are all in the United States Code and case law. 
Railroad antitrust exemptions apply only if the Surface Transportation Board (STB) regulates 
the firm or if the STB approves the action. 
4.1. Transactional Immunity 
The Transportation Act of 1920 gave the STB exclusive purview over specified railroad 
transactions, and states that if a transaction is approved by the STB, it is exempt from antitrust 
laws (49 USC §11321[a]). Transactions that can be “approved or exempted” by the STB include 
mergers, acquisitions, leases, trackage rights (the right to use but not own rail lines), and joint 
ownership of rail lines (49 USC § 11323). Therefore, among other transactions, if a merger is 
approved by the STB, it is expressly exempt from challenge under Section 7 of the Clayton Act. 
This is a powerful immunity because it has permitted the industry to become extremely 
concentrated without allowing the Department of Justice to sue for antitrust violations. With 
four large railroads currently controlling 90% of the railroad market (S. Rep. No. 112-38, 2011), 
this immunity almost surely has shielded otherwise illegal mergers that “tend to create a 
monopoly” (Clayton Act). 
4.2. Rate Agreements 
Enacted by the Reed-Bulwinkle Act of 1948, railroad rate agreements can be exempted from 
antitrust laws with approval by the STB (49 USC §10706[a][2][A]). If this exemption did not 
exist, the conduct would likely be a per se illegal violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, which 
prohibits conspiracies in restraint of trade, such as price fixing. Nevertheless, the antitrust 
exemption permits firms to coordinate their actions. When firms are permitted to coordinate 
their actions, they have an incentive to mutually raise prices. 
4.3. Rate Bureaus 
The Reed-Bulwinkle Act of 1948 also allowed the creation of ‘rate bureaus.’ Rate bureaus are 
organizations of railroad firms where the companies discuss rates jointly. While rate bureaus are 
still legal (49 USC §10706[a][2][A]), their activities have been restricted to ameliorate the 
potential for anticompetitive collusion. Currently under 49 USC §10706(a)(3)(A), once the STB 
approves a rate, a member in that bureau cannot participate in discussions concerning another 
firm’s rates. Rail firms are also prohibited from discussing rates that another firm proposes for 
interline services “unless that carrier practicably participates in the movement” (49 
Oregon Undergraduate Research Journal   William Goodling 
1.1 Fall 2011  15 
USC §[a][3][A][ii]). Rate bureaus must report transcripts and audio recordings of all discussions 
to the STB. While these restrictions help reduce the potential for anticompetitive conduct in rate 
bureaus, it is nevertheless questionable why rate bureaus – would-be competitors jointly 
discussing rates – are exempt from antitrust laws.  
4.4. Interlocking Directorates 
Under the Transportation Act of 1920, if the STB approves interlocking directorates for 
railroad firms – a practice otherwise prohibited by Section 8 of the Clayton Act – it is legal and 
exempt from antitrust challenge (American Bar Association [ABA], 2007). Interlocking 
directorates are individuals who serve on the board of directors of multiple corporations, which 
can lead to serious issues of conspiracies in restraint of trade among firms that are ostensibly 
competitors. 
4.5. Line Sales  
The STB is authorized to review all sales, creations, and abandonments of railroad lines, and 
its approval immunizes the transaction from the antitrust laws (49 USC §10901). From the 
perspective of promoting competition, this immunity is problematic because it can allow a 
dominant firm to exploit smaller railroad companies to enhance its dominant position. For 
example, this exemption is the source of exclusionary conduct known as ‘paper barriers.’ In 
many line sales, major railroads divest track to regional operators that, after the sale, are 
connected with the seller’s main lines. In the line sale contract, the seller mandates that the 
buyer only interchange its traffic from the divested line to the seller, precluding the ability to 
interchange traffic with other railroads (ABA, 2007). If there were no antitrust immunities, this 
would be a patent violation of Section 3 of the Clayton Act, which prohibits just such 
exclusionary conduct that artificially reduces competition. 
4.6. Pooling Arrangements and Division of Traffic 
The STB can approve combinations to pool or divide traffic, services, or revenues between 
carriers, which indirectly approves a rate agreement (49 USC §11322). If these divisions and 
pooling of revenues are approved, they are exempt from the antitrust laws (49 USC §11321[a]). If 
it were not for antitrust immunity, pooling arrangements would be prosecuted as conspiracies in 
restraint of trade under Section 1 of the Sherman Act. For all other industries, agreements 
between competitors to pool or divide business are per se illegal because they are adverse to 
competition (U.S. v. Topco Associates, Inc., 1972). 
4.7. No Injunctive Relief for Private Parties 
For other industries, under the Clayton Act (15 USC §26), private parties threatened with 
loss or damage by a violation of the antitrust laws can sue for injunctive relief in a civil action to 
enjoin an illegal activity. However, Section 16 of the Clayton Act prohibits private parties from 
suing railroad firms for injunctive relief under any antitrust law.  
4.8. The Keogh Doctrine: No Treble Damages for Private Parties 
Under the Keogh doctrine (Keogh v. Chicago & NW Railway Co., 1922), treble damages are 
unavailable for private shippers who challenge the reasonableness of rates submitted to the STB. 
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Along with the railroad’s immunity from private party injunctions described above in Section 
4.7, the Keogh doctrine narrows the scope of remedies that private parties can obtain against 
railroads under the antitrust laws to only singular monetary damages. 
4.9. Secretary of Transportation Conferences 
Conferences among railroads, shippers, labor organizations, consumer representatives and 
government agencies may be convened by the Secretary of Transportation, and agreements 
entered into with the Secretary’s approval through these conferences are exempted from 
antitrust laws (49 USC §333). This immunity grants opaque – and therefore dangerous – power 
to the Secretary of Transportation. 
4.10. Federal Trade Commission Act Enforcement 
The Federal Trade Commission Act (FTC Act) prohibits “unfair methods of competition … 
and deceptive acts” in commerce, and establishes that the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) is 
the exclusive enforcer of the law. However, Section 5 of the FTC Act (15 USC §45) states that the 
FTC cannot enforce the law against railroads; rather, the STB has sole authority to enforce 
compliance with the FTC Act against railroads (15 USC §21[a]). This sweeping antitrust 
exemption entirely removes one of the foundational antitrust laws from enforcement by any 
party besides the STB. 
To summarize, railroad antitrust exemptions apply if a firm is under STB jurisdiction or if 
the STB approves the action. Therefore, the STB essentially has exclusive control of 
anticompetitive issues in the railroad industry, which is why the STB has been described as a 
“surrogate” to antitrust laws (ABA, 2007). However, the deregulated STB is “largely 
inaccessible,” “time consuming, and complex” (GAO, 2006), and its proceedings are financially 
prohibitive for the vast majority of shippers (Johnstone [2009] and Pittman [2010a]). Given 
this, it is problematic that there is no recourse for those who believe that the STB’s decisions will 
be adverse to competition except general rules of administrative procedures (Brennan, 2009). 
5. Analysis of the Counterfactual: No Antitrust Immunities 
I have described the historical and current regime governing the railroad industry. Because 
presumably some form of government intervention is necessary to police the naturally 
monopolistic railroad industry, the efficacy of this particular regime of government intervention 
in railroad markets is an important investigation. There is a wide literature on the positive 
effects of the Staggers Rail Act deregulation (summarized in GAO, 2006), so it is not efficacious 
to have a federal agency heavy-handedly manage industry and establish rail rates (as the ICC did 
prior to the Staggers Rail Act). However, what is less clear is the desirability of antitrust 
immunities. What would happen in the railroad industry if there were full antitrust liability, as 
in virtually all other industries? This is an important consideration because members of the U.S. 
Congress recently proposed the abolishment of all railroad antitrust immunities in the Railroad 
Antitrust Enforcement Act of 2011 (S. 49, 2011). 
The literature addressing what would happen if antitrust immunities were repealed is 
limited (Pittman [2010b], Brennan [2009], Massa [2001], and Saggers [2009]). The Staggers 
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Rail Act deregulation, in combination with continued antitrust immunities, has engendered 
several deleterious anticompetitive issues for a minority of ‘captive shippers.’ Even though 
deregulation under the Staggers Rail Act increased welfare in significant ways, it does not 
necessarily imply that application of the antitrust laws could not further increase welfare by 
ameliorating specific anticompetitive conduct that is harming certain shippers. Two important 
anticompetitive issues are refusal-to-deal in ‘bottleneck’ markets, and exclusive-dealing 
contracts known as ‘paper barriers.’ A third crucial consideration is the overall concentration of 
the railroad industry. In what follows, I consider what would occur in the counterfactual 
situation of abolishing antitrust immunities. 
5.1. Refusal-to-Deal in ‘Bottleneck’ Markets 
Many rail customers, known as “captive shippers,” are served by only a single railroad at 
either their origin or destination. However, over some portion of the captive shipper’s route, 
another railroad could compete for the shipment service. This market is illustrated in Figure 1: 
 
Figure 1. Such rail markets are called “bottleneck markets” because the portion from B to C narrows to 
just one rail provider, like the neck of a bottle narrows. Source: Wilson and Burton (2006). 
Consider a shipper at C who needs to ship a product to A. From C to B the shipper is captive 
to a pure monopolist, but from B to A there could be two firms competing to lower rates. 
Currently, the monopolist who controls C to B forecloses the possibility of competition on the 
segment from B to A. The monopolist achieves this by either refusing to grant trackage rights 
over C to B to other railroads, or refusing to offer a route that would stop at the point where the 
carrier could be switched to allow for competition (i.e., only offering C to A and refusing to offer 
C to B). The STB approved these tactics to hold a shipper captive over an entire route, so the 
conduct gained antitrust immunity (Central Power and Light Co. v. Southern Pacific 
Transportation Co., 1997).  
There is a consensus in the literature that captive shippers pay higher rates than non-captive 
shippers, which suggests captive shippers’ rates are affected by market power abuse (GAO 
[2006], S. Rep. 111-9 [2009], Ellig [2002], Saggers [2009], Brennan [2009], Pittman [2010b], 
and S. Rep 112-38 [2011]). Grimm and Winston (2000) estimate that captive shippers pay rates 
which are 20.9% higher than non-captive shippers. If there were no antitrust immunities, these 
Oregon Undergraduate Research Journal   William Goodling 
1.1 Fall 2011  18 
practices would be evaluated as refusal-to-deal monopolization violations of Section 2 of the 
Sherman Act, or as tying arrangements violations of Section 3 of the Clayton Act. 
Refusal-to-deal violations of Section 2 of the Sherman Act occur when a business refuses to 
sell to another business or consumer for the purpose of driving the other business into 
bankruptcy or to raise prices for the consumer. However, the Court ruled in Verizon v. Trinko 
(2004) that refusal-to-deal would be illegal only if the firm was stopping a practice it had 
formerly been undertaking, and the firm would lose profits by stopping the practice (except for 
longer-run monopolist benefits). In addition, in Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite (1984), the Court 
ruled that a seller “has a right to deal, or refuse to deal, with whomever it likes, as long as it does 
so independently.” Under this case law, refusal-to-deal violations are rare and difficult to prove 
(Pittman, 2010b).  
In Verizon v. Trinko (2004) and Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite (1984) the essential facility 
doctrine, which proves refusal-to-deal monopolization, was not relevant; in bottleneck railroad 
markets, however, the essential facility doctrine is highly relevant. The essential facility doctrine 
holds that for refusal-to-deal monopolization to be present, the plaintiff must prove (1) the 
monopolist controls an essential facility, (2) competitors are reasonably unable to duplicate the 
essential facility, (3) the monopolist denies use of the facility to a competitor, and (4) the 
monopolist could feasibly provide the facility (Gellhorn & Kovacic, 1994). Based on these 
criteria, if antitrust immunities were abolished, the refusal-to-deal conduct of the initial rail 
monopolist would be illegal monopolization. That is, the railroad firm that is a monopolist over 
C to B controls an essential facility (the monopoly route); there are prohibitive costs for a 
competitor to construct a competing line over that segment; the monopolist denies the potential 
competitor trackage rights; and the monopolist could feasibly offer those trackage rights. In 
sum, if antitrust immunities were abolished and the plaintiff could successfully argue that the 
essential facility doctrine is the relevant authority, the conduct in bottleneck markets would be 
illegal under Sherman Act Section 2 as refusal-to-deal monopolization. 
An alternative way to prosecute conduct arising in bottleneck markets is through a Clayton 
Act Section 3 lawsuit that alleges a tying agreement. Tying agreements occur when a seller gives 
a buyer access to the seller’s service only if the buyer takes other services as well. For the shipper 
in Figure 1, a railroad only offering shipping from C to A could be framed as a tying 
arrangement. If a shipper uses C to B, then they are forced by necessity to also use B to A. This is 
a plausible argument, and tying agreements supported by market power have been enforced 
strictly (Caves, 1994). As outlined in Grappone, Inc. v. Subaru of New England, Inc. (1988), for 
a tying agreement to be found illegal, the plaintiff must prove: (1) there are distinct services, (2) 
the seller has required the buyer to purchase the tied product in order to obtain the tying 
product, (3) the seller has market power in the market for the tying product, and (4) the tying 
arrangement affects a substantial amount of commerce in the market for the tied service. The 
monopolist railroad company has market power, and a substantial amount of commerce is 
involved in any given railroad market, so conditions (3) and (4) are satisfied. What is debatable 
is whether the railroad is offering two services (C to B and then B to A) or only one service (C to 
A). If the railroads were to be found in violation of the Clayton Act Section 3 for a tying 
agreement, the plaintiffs would need to successfully portray the two segments as distinct 
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services that were tied together solely for the purpose of excluding the competitor. Given the 
empirical evidence of higher rates for captive shippers, it is a convincing argument that two 
independent lines are joined for the purpose of exploiting market power to increase rates.  
In sum, railroads holding shippers captive over portions of track where competition could 
prevail is anticompetitive. This conduct could be prosecuted as a refusal-to-deal offense under 
the essential facility doctrine (Sherman Act Section 2) or a tying arrangement violation (Clayton 
Act Section 3). If antitrust immunity were removed, litigation would expose the details of these 
issues to determine legality of conduct. Moreover, as Pittman (2010b) suggests, the mere threat 
of this litigation could force railroads to negotiate lower rates rather than risk going to court for 
potentially exploiting captive shippers. 
5.2. Exclusive-Dealing Contracts 
One goal of the Staggers Rail Act was to decrease regulations that prevented the 
“rationalizing” of rail lines, which means selling or abandoning unprofitable lines. Due to these 
deregulations, large and dominant railroads have leased or spun-off portions of track to form 
smaller regional short line railroads. These transactions often come with contractual conditions 
– called ‘paper barriers’ – that require the new buyer of the line to only engage in transit with 
the previous owner. Line sales are under the STB’s jurisdiction, so it has the power to reject 
these transactions if it believes they are contrary to the public interest. However, the STB has 
regularly approved these contracts, which then immunizes them from antitrust laws. These 
contracts are anticompetitive because they decrease shipper’s options and expose them to a firm 
with increased market power. The contractual barriers are additionally inefficient because they 
result in idle short line capacity even though market demand would otherwise provide 
productive opportunities. 
If antitrust immunity were removed, these paper barriers could be prosecuted under Section 
3 of the Clayton Act as tying arrangement or exclusive-dealing violations. As outlined in the 
bottleneck market context, for a tying agreement to be found illegal, the plaintiff must prove: (1) 
there are distinct services, (2) the seller has required the buyer to purchase the tied service in 
order to obtain the tying service, (3) the seller has market power in the market for the tying 
service, and (4) the tying arrangement affects a substantial amount of commerce in the market 
for the tied service (Grappone, Inc. v. Subaru of New England, 1988). Based on these criteria, 
paper barriers would be illegal tying arrangements because the seller is tying the sale of its line 
to its transit service. 
A second way paper barriers would be illegal is as exclusive-dealing contracts in violation of 
Section 3 of the Clayton Act. Exclusive-dealing arrangements occur when a seller gives the buyer 
access to its goods only if the buyer agrees to not buy goods from any of the seller’s rivals. The 
courts have enforced violations of exclusive-dealing arrangements if dominant sellers use it to 
place newcomer sellers at a disadvantage (Caves, 1994), and in general the courts have treated 
them harshly (Viscusi et al., 1998). To evaluate the reasonableness of exclusive-dealing 
contracts, courts usually consider three factors: (1) the extent of market foreclosure, (2) the 
duration of the exclusive dealing, and (3) the height of entry barriers (Gellhorn & Kovacic, 
1994). Under these criteria, with antitrust immunities abolished, paper barriers would be illegal 
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exclusive-dealing violations because they force the buyer of the short line to not do business 
with the seller’s rivals; they indefinitely foreclose the market; and they establish significant 
barriers of entry for competition.  
Whether as a tying agreement or an exclusive-dealing agreement under Section 3 of the 
Clayton Act, if antitrust immunities were abandoned the railroad industries’ paper barriers 
would face antitrust liability. Judicial scrutiny and any appropriate remedies, such as 
injunctions enjoining the practice, would be welcomed. Shippers who are currently forced to use 
a monopolist provider to gain access to short lines under paper barriers would enjoy the benefits 
of increased competition—principally, lower rates. 
5.3. Mergers and Industry Concentration 
Under the STB’s approval of mergers, the U.S. railroad industry has been extensively 
consolidated: four major railroad companies currently control nearly 90% of the market’s 
revenues (S. Rep. No. 112-38, 2011). This is an astonishing lack of competition, and suggests that 
railroad companies are not robustly competing to bid down rates. Indeed, in the last decade the 
four largest railroad firms have annually raised their rates 5% above inflation and have 
increased their profit margin to 13%, making railroads the fifth most profitable industry in the 
U.S. (S. Rep. No. 112-38, 2011). This directly harms shippers but also consumers by raising the 
price of the goods that are shipped, such as foodstuffs and coal for electricity. 
The mergers that created the concentration of the railroad industry are exempt from 
antitrust laws because they were approved by the STB. However, if antitrust immunities were 
abolished, there would likely be colossal confrontations in court brought by the Department of 
Justice (Pittman, 2010b) to determine whether the mergers amounted to monopolization under 
Section 2 of the Sherman Act, or violated Section 7 of the Clayton Act, which prohibit mergers 
where “the effect may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.” A 
plain reading of this law implies that the mergers would be found illegal, and the firms could be 
ordered to break into smaller firms that compete with each other. This would help avoid the 
market power abuse that leads to increased prices for all consumers. 
5.4. Other Legal Effects of Antitrust Immunity Repeal 
If antitrust immunities were revoked from the railroad industry, their rate agreements and 
rate bureaus exemptions would be illegal under antitrust law. For example, this would permit a 
shipper who alleged a rate was excessive due to a collusive rate agreement to sue the railroad 
under Section 1 of the Sherman Act. Additionally, the current railroad arrangement to pool and 
divide traffic would be illegal under antitrust law, namely as an illegal market allocation under 
Section 1 of the Sherman Act. With antitrust immunity abandoned, the FTC would be allowed to 
prosecute railroad companies under the FTC Act, which prohibits “… unfair or deceptive acts or 
practices in or affecting commerce…” (15 USC § 45). Given the breadth of the phrase “unfair or 
deceptive acts,” this could entail nearly any conduct that the FTC deems anticompetitive, such as 
bottleneck market tactics designed to make shippers captive to one company. Lastly, if antitrust 
immunities were abandoned, the remedies available to private parties would be expanded to 
include injunctive relief and treble damages, which would encourage more antitrust lawsuits 
and thus less market power abuse. 
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6. Conclusion 
The regime governing the railroad industry since 1980 – a deregulated federal agency 
coupled with broad antitrust immunities – in some ways has presided over a period with 
significant improvements in railroad industry conditions, such as productivity gains and 
restored financial health. However, extensive industry consolidation is likely responsible for 
rising prices, and some specific complaints remain for shippers who have excessively limited 
transportation options. If antitrust immunities were repealed, shippers with grievances 
(especially captive shippers in bottleneck markets and shippers subject to paper-barriers from 
line spin-offs) would be able to sue railroad companies for violations of antitrust laws. If the 
facts substantiated the allegations in the courts, then the result would be a more competitive and 
efficient railroad market because courts would enjoin railroad conduct that reduces competition. 
Antitrust immunities were initially implemented because at the time there was a federal 
agency that resolved anticompetitive concerns with aggressive regulation. However, now that 
the industry has been largely deregulated, there is not a sufficiently accessible or responsive 
mechanism for responding to anticompetitive conduct. By removing antitrust immunities, as 
members of the U.S. Congress have currently proposed in the Railroad Antitrust Enforcement 
Act of 2011 (S. 49, 2011), the industry would couple deregulation with a more logically consistent 
application of the antitrust laws. Under this new regime, as in virtually all other markets, market 
forces would determine prices, entry, and exit. Furthermore, in the spirit of Justice Thurgood 
Marshall's principle that antitrust laws are "the Magna Carta of free enterprise" that are 
fundamental "to the preservation of economic freedom and our free enterprise system" (United 
States v. Topco Associates, Inc., 1972), if any firm used market power to abuse the competitive 
marketplace, antitrust lawsuits would be an available remedy to make the marketplace efficient 
and fair. 
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